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BRIEF OF APPELLANT DAVID S. GROW IN ANSWER TO 
RESPONDENT BOARDWALK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION'S 
AND RESPONDENT PHOENIX DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by Appellant David S. Grow to obtain 
an order declaring that Respondents have, by their defaults and 
failure to cure the same, forfeited to Appellant all of their 
right, title and interest as purchasers under a certain Uniform 
Real Estate Contract (the "Contract") and quieting Appellant's 
title to the real property which is the subject of the Contract. 
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This action, as decided below and as presented on appeal' does 
not involve the question of liquidated damages d p un er aragraph 
16A of the Contract. The only question presented on appeal is 
whether Respondents were entitled to a Summary Judgment that 
they had not forfeited their interest under the Contract. 
PRIOR DISPOSITION OF THIS COURT 
On December 10, 1980, this Court reversed the Distrk 
Court's entry of Summary Judgment which declared that Respondei· 
had not forfeited their interest under the Contract. 
RELIEF SOUGHT WITH RESPECT TO THE 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to deny 
Respondents' Petition for Rehearing and to remand the case to'.: 
District Court in accordance with its December 10, 1980 opinion 
(the "Opinion"). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties are identified in this Brief as they appO' 
in Appellant's Brief on file herein. Appellant incorporates 01 
reference the Statement of Facts set forth in Appellant's Briei 
and Appellant's Reply Brief on file herein. 
Appellant objects to Respondents' Statement of fact: 
set forth in their Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing 
-2-
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(the "Rehearing Brief") upon the grounds that Respondents have 
misstated several material facts. Appellant submits the fol-
lowing connnents to correct the erroneous Statement of Facts 
submitted by Respondents. 
A. No Certificates of Deposit. 
Contrary to the representations set forth in three 
separate lines in the Rehearing Brief (Rehearing Brief at 4, 
7 and 9), there are no Certificates of Deposit placed with or 
held by the Registry of the Court. The Record on Appeal contains 
no evidence whatsoever that any Certificates of Deposit have ever 
been placed with the Registry of the Court in connection with 
this case. Moreover, the Clerk of the Court has recently certi-
fied that no Certificates of Deposit have ever been deposited 
into or held by the Registry of the Court in connection with this 
case. The Clerk's certificate (the "Clerk's Certificate") is 
attached hereto as Appendix "A" . 
Appellant is well aware of the principles of law which 
generally disallow consideration on appeal of documents or 
information not otherwise contained in the Record on Appeal. 
(See cases and citations set forth in Appellant's Reply Brief at 
1-4.) Nevertheless, the flagrant misstatements reiterated in 
the Rehearing Brief and relied upon so heavily as the very crux 
of the Rehearing Brief require submission of some evidence to 
substantiate the truth of the matter. The Clerk's Certificate 
Provides the best, indeed the only, evidence on this issue. 
-3-
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In any event, the Clerk's Certificate concerns only inf . ormatio~ 
of which the Court otherwise could and should take judicial 
notice. Accordingly, Appellant respectfully asks the Court to 
take notice of the Clerk's Certificate in determining the trut: .. 
fulness of Respondents' allegations of fact. 
B. Funds Sufficient To Cure The Defaults Are Not on 
Deposit With The Court. 
Respondents' Petition and Rehearing Brief also gross!; 
misstate the amount of funds on deposit with the Registry of t~ 1 
Court. Respondents' Petition alleges that "[i]f it is ... 
determined at trial that the Appellant's interpretation of the 
Contract is correct, the Contract would be brought current fro: 
payments previously deposited by Respondents into the Registrv:' 
the Court." (Respondents' Petition at 3.) The Rehearing Brief 
claims that "sufficient funds have been placed ... into the 
Registry of the Court to cure any alleged default under the 
Contract, regardless of the interpretation which the District 
Court gives to Paragraph llB." (Rehearing Brief at 4.) Simila~ 
statements are twice again repeated in the Rehearing Brief. 
(Rehearing Brief at 7 and 9.) The statements simply are not 
true. 
The amount necessary to cure the admitted defaults, 
including interest at 18% on delinquent payments only, is 
$ cure the admitted defaul: 72, 140. 01 . The amount necessary to 
including interest at 18% on the entire unpaid contract balance 
-4-
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during the period of default is $75,728.17. (See computations 
attached as Appendix "B".) The Clerk's Certificate certifies 
that the funds on deposit with the Registry of the Court total 
$25,114.00, leaving substantial deficiencies of $47 ,026.01 
and p0,614. 70 , respectively. 
Whatever benefit Respondents intended to derive from 
their patently erroneous and repetitive statements of their 
present ability to cure defaults out of funds deposited with the 
Registry of the Court must not be allowed them. The facts are 
not as Respondents claim. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Respondents acknowledge that "petitions for rehearing 
are denied almost perfunctorily." (Rehearing Brief at 4-5.) 
Appellant agrees. Al though a party may, as a matter of right, 
file a petition for rehearing under Rule 76(e) (1), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the threshold for granting such petitions is 
very high. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it 
"cannot grant a rehearing unless a strong showing therefor be 
made." Ducheneau v. House, 4 Utah 483, llP. 618 (1886)(emphasis 
added); ~ also In re Mac Knight, 4 Utah 237, 9 P. 299 (1886). 
The Court has on prior occassions discussed the policy 
considerations underpinning this very strict standard of review 
on petitions for rehearing. For example, in Cummings v. Nielson, 
42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913), the Utah Supreme Court 
explained at length: 
-5-
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We desire to add a word in conclusion re-
~pect~ng the numerous applications for rehearin s 
in this court. To make an application for a g 
rehearing is a matter of right, and we have no 
d~sire to discou:age ~he practice of filing peti-
tions for rehearings in proper cases. When this 
court, however, has considered and decided all of 
the material questions involved in a case a 
rehearing should not be applied for, unle~s we 
have misconstrued or overlooked some material fact 
or facts, or have overlooked some statute or 
decision which may affect the result, or that we 
have based the decision on some wrong principle of 
law, or have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the result. In 
this case nothing was done or attempted by counsel 
except to reargue the very propositions we had ' 
fully considered and decided. If we should write 
opinions on all the petitions for rehearings 
filed, we would have to devote a very large por-
tion of our time in answering counsel's conten-
tions a second time; and, if we should grant 
rehearings because they are demanded, we should do 
nothing else save to write and rewrite opinions in 
a few cases. Let it again be said that it is 
conceded, as a matter of course, that we cannot 
convince losing counsel that their contentions 
should not prevail, but in making this concession 
let it also be remembered that we, and not counsel, 
must ultimately assume all responsibility with 
respect to whether our conclusions are sound or 
unsound. Our endeavor is to determine all cases 
correctly upon the law and the facts, and, if we 
fail in this, it is because we are incapable of 
arriving at just conclusions. As a general rule, 
therefore, merely to reargue the grounds originally 
presented can be of little, if any, aid to us. If 
there are some reasons, however, such as we h~v7 
indicated above, or other good reasons, a petit~fn 
for a rehearing should be promptly filed, and, 1 
it is meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
The grounds for granting a petition for rehearing are 
narrow indeed. In Beaver County v. Home Indemnity Co· , 88 Utah 
held that if 1, 52 P.2d 435, 459 (1935), the Utah Supreme Court 
-6-
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an "opinion is to be modified, it should be modified because it 
fails correctly to state the law, or for some other reason which 
makes its language or statements improper or inapplicable." The 
court "cannot grant a rehearing for the purpose of dropping out 
of the opinion parts unsatisfactory to counsel and leaving in [or 
adding] parts evidently satisfactory to counsel." Id. The Court 
has rightly noted that a "defeated party usually feels that the 
decision is not good law, but that furnishes no ground for a 
rehearing." Cunnington v. Scott, 4 Utah 484, 11 P. 619 (1886). 
In denying a petition for rehearing in Ducheneau v. 
House the Court concluded: 
The petition for rehearing states no new 
facts or grounds for a reversal of the judgment of 
the lower court. It is mainly a reargument of the 
case. We have repeatedly called attention to the 
fact that no rehearing will be granted where 
nothing new and important is offered for our con-
sideration .... A reargument, or an argument 
with the court upon the points of the decision, 
with no new light given, is not such a showing. 
11 P. at 619. In In re Mac Knight, the Court observed that: 
[T]o justify a rehearing, a strong case must 
be made. We must be convinced, either that the 
court failed to consider some material point in 
the case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or 
that some matter has been discovered which was 
unknown when the case was argued. 
9 P · at 299-300. 
A fairly concise summary of the standard of review on 
rehearing cases is found in 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error § 988 
(l962) (footnotes omitted) : 
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Rehearings are not granted as a matter of 
right, and are not allowed merely for the purpo 
of. r7argument, unless there is a reasonable pro~: 
ability that the court may have arrived at an 
erron7ous conclusion or overlooked some important 
question or matter necessary to a correct decision 
The rehearing may be granted if the decision was 
based on a wrong principle of law, as where the 
decision is in conflict with an express statute 
or with a controlling decision to which the cou~t's 
attention was not called, or where a higher appel-
late court has decided the precise question ad-
versely after the decision. Misconception by the 
appellate court of the proof in a material regard 
or prediction of the decision upon the appeal on~ 
false record, or on a record that was misconstrued 
by the appellate court, may justify a rehearing. 
A rehearing may also be granted in some jurisdic-
tions to permit a proper entry of the court's 
decision, or to correct an error in the opinion or 
judgment describing the land in litigation. 
As illustrated below, there is no sufficient ground to warrant 
the Petition for Rehearing. 
ARGUMENT I 
THERE IS NO GROUND UPON WHICH 
THE OPINION MAY BE RECONSIDERED 
The Opinion reversed the Summary Judgment in which the 
trial court held "respondents had not forfeited their interest 
under a uniform reai estate contract". (Opinion at 1.) This 
Court held: "The correct interpretation of paragraph llB woula 
also require determination as to the sufficiency of the tender 
made by the respondents to prevent the forfeiture of the ~ 
dd d ) The Court then held paragrai~ (Opinion at 4.) (Emphasis A e . 
f . ts ambigu: 
llB ambiguous and remanded the case for resolution ° 1 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in order that sufficiency of the tender "to prevent the forfeiture" 
might be determined. 
The Petition and Rehearing Brief do not allege any 
misconception or misconstruction by the Court of the Record on 
Appeal; nor do Respondents claim the Record on Appeal is false. 
Respondents do not attempt to correct any claimed error in the 
Opinion with respect to the description of the property which is 
the subject matter of the Contract. 
Furthermore, Respondents are not arguing that the 
Court reached an erroneous conclusion, i.e. , they do not contend 
that reversal of the Summary Judgment was improper. Also Respon-
dents do not complain that such reversal is based upon a wrong 
principle of law or that such reversal is in conflict with any 
express statute or a controlling decision to which the Court's 
attention was not called. 
The only ground asserted by Respondents in support of 
their Petition, is that the Opinion fails to deny Appellant the 
availability of the remedy of forfeiture upon remand. Respondents' 
position is transparently based upon two premises, both of which 
are false: (1) That the Court has not decided the issue raised 
in the Petition, and (2) that Respondents have deposited into 
the Registry of the Court amounts sufficient to cure their 
admitted defaults. 
As discussed in the foregoing Statement of Facts, 
Respondents' assertions regarding the sufficiency of deposits 
-9-
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into the Court are simply false. The Clerk's Certificate 
must 
resolve any doubt to the falsity of this premise of Respond 
en ts' 
position. 
Respondents' contention that this Court has not decide 
the forfeiture issue is plainly misplaced. On appeal, Responder: 
raised the very issues argued in their Petition, including the 
claimed authority of certain dicta from Wingets Incorporate~ 
Bitters, 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P. 2d 1007 (1972). (See Respondenti 
Brief at 15.) Except for the added misstatements concerning 
certificates of deposit and the sufficiency of funds placed witt 
the clerk of the trial court, the Petition and Rehearing Brief 
are nothing more than a rehash of arguments previous made to ani 
rejected by this Court. Indeed, Respondents' claim that the 
forfeiture issue has not been decided comes close to questionin! 
the astuteness of this Court. 
The arguments raised by Respondents in the Rehearing 
Brief are merely a restatement of Argument II of Respondents' 
Brief. The Court should note that Argument III of the Rehearini 
Brief is a verbatim reproduction of Argument II of Respondents' 
Brief, supplemented by the factual misstatements discussed above 
Wingets was cited and discussed in Respondents' Brief. The 
Petition and Rehearing Brief present no authority or principle 
. d d 1: 
which was not also presented in Respondents' Brief and deci e 
the Opinion. 
. . . that the It is obvious from a reading of the Opinion 
forfeiture issue was decided by this Court, albeit against 
-10-
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Respondents. The opening statement of the Opinion describes the 
summary judgment as holding that "respondents had not forfeited 
their interest under a uniform real estate contract." (Opinion 
at 1.) The Opinion clearly reverses said Summary Judgment and 
remands the case for trial on the interpretation of paragraph 
llB. In remanding the case, this Court expressly acknowledged 
that: "The correct interpretation of paragraph llB would also 
require determination as to the sufficiency of the tender made 
by the respondents to prevent the forfeiture of the contract." 
(Opinion at 4.) (Emphasis Added.) Certainly this Court con-
sidered the arguments and authorities cited in Respondents' 
Brief in deciding this case. This is evidenced by the careful 
language of the Opinion referred to above. The Opinion plainly 
decided this issue against Respondents and nothing new or impor-
tant is now offered for the Court's consideration. Respondents 
point to no new fact or principle of law that would affect the 
Opinion. As stated in Cunnington v. Scott, a "defeated party 
usually feels that the decision is not good law, but that furnishes 
no ground for a rehearing''. 11 P. at 619. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE OPINION IS NOT CONTRARY TO 
PREVIOUS DECISIONS OF THE COURT 
The major point raised in the Rehearing Brief is the 
argument that forfeitures will not be enforced unless the forfeiture 
-11-
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G 
terms are clear and unequivocal. The only authority cited in 
support of this proposition is Winge ts Incorporated v. Bitters 
-------.;_, 
28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007 (1972). It is 
the Opinion does not quote or cite Wingets. 
not surprising thal 
The language from 
Wingets upon which Respondents rely is ambiguous dicta at best 
and could not properly be the basis for the Opinion. 
A. The Winge ts Language is Dicta. Winge ts was a reo. 
estate contract case involving a contract with three remedy 
options: the typical Uniform Real Estate Contract forfeiture 
provision, a contract balance acceleration provision, and a 
provision allowing specific enforcement by appropriate action. 
Upon the buyer's default, the seller elected to accelerate pa)'llt 
on the contract balance, and the trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the seller. 
On appeal, the buyer contested the propriety of the 
summary judgment claiming the existence of genuine issues of 
material fact concerning the interpretation of the contract's 
default notice provisions. The Supreme Court reversed the sum· 
mary judgment on the basis of the existence of such material 
facts. In doing so, the Court in dicta commented that certain 
rules of construction are "especially true as to a forfeiture, 
which is enforced only when the terms are clear and unequivocal 
500 P. 2d at 1010. The quoted language was not, as Respondents 
f h ld . f h · · The case did not claim, part o the o ing o t e opinion. 
even involve a claimed forfeiture. At most, the statement was 
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offered merely as something which would "tend to give support to 
the position essayed by the defendants: i.e., that they have 
raised an issue of fact as to what was intended by the language 
of the contract." Id. Consequently, it cannot be said that 
Wingets is controlling authority which should govern in this 
case, or that renders the Opinion erroneous or misleading. 
B. The Wingets Dicta is Itself Ambiguous. 
The language from Wingets upon which Respondents rely 
is not only dicta, it is also ambiguous. Can it mean that 
forfeitures will not be enforced as to any contract which contains 
an alleged ambiguity relating to some other provision of the 
contract? Or should it mean that forfeitures will not be enforced 
unless the Contract specifically sets forth a forfeiture remedy? 
Or that the forfeiture provisions themselves must be clear and 
unequivocal? Certainly, the latter two constructions more 
nearly reflect the intended principle of law. Otherwise, any 
ambiguity in any provision of a real estate contract would 
deprive a party of its bargained-for forfeiture remedy under a 
contract. 
That the latter constructions are the more precise 
statement of the law is evidenced by the following cases: 
~es v. Thorvaldson, 15 Utah 2d 308, 392 P. 2d 43 (1964) ; 
~n R. Hansen, Inc. v. Pacific Intern. Corp., 76 Wash.2d 220, 
455 P.2d 946 (1969); Engle v. First Nat. Bank, 590 P.2d 826 
(Wyo, 1979). All of such cases focus on whether the language of 
-13-
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the contract creates a clear and unequivocal right of f 
orfeitu:: 
not whether all other terms of the contract are clear and un. 
equivocal. 
Respondents have never contended that the Contract 
does not contain a specific forfeiture provision. It does. 
Nor have Respondents ever claimed that said forfeiture provisk 
is itself ambiguous. It is not. Consequently, application 0; 
Winge ts dictum would not result in denial of the forfeiture 
remedy in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing analysis it is clear that the 
Wingets dicta was not important enough to deserve colllillent in 
the Opinion. Nor does Respondents' emphasis on such dicta provi 
grounds for a rehearing. 
In all events, the Wingets dicta and all of Responden: 
arguments were fully briefed and argued prior to the issuance of 
the Opinion. The only new matters raised by the Petition and 
the Rehearing Brief are certain misstatements of fact obviousli 
intended as some make-weight argument for granting Respondents' 
Petition. 
The language of the Opinion resolves the forfeiture 
issue against Respondents, and is not inconsistent with the 
h dl..cta were applicable. ~ij~ Wingets dicta, even assuming sue 
dents' Petition should therefore be denied, and the case 
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d d to the District Court in accordance with the Opinion. reman e 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of January 1981. 
MARTINEAU, ROOKER, LARSEN & KIMBALL 
1800 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
David S. Grow 
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DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION'S AND RESPONDENT PHOENIX DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION'S PETITION FOR REHEARING were served this 19th 
day of January, 1981, upon the Defendants-Respondents and 
Intervenor-Respondent by mailing the same, postage prepaid to 
the following : 
Ronald R. Stanger, Esq. 
38 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Marwick Development, 
Inc. and Sterling Martell 
David R. Olsen, Esq. 
SUITTER, AXLAND & ARMSTRONG 
2150 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Boardwalk Development 
Corporation 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Esq. 
SUITTER, AXLA..~D & ARMSTRONG 
2150 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Phoenix Development 
Corporation 
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-
In The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
of the State of Utah 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
DAVID S. GROW, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
- vs -
MARWICK DEVELOPMENT, INC. , A 
COPRORATION; DANIEL R. SOUTHWICK; 
STERLING MARTELL7 ET AL., 
Defendants and Respondents, 
AND 
BOARDWALK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 
Defendant, Intervenor and 
Respondent. 
CIVIL NO. 49,549 





I, WILLIAM F. HUISH, COUNTY CLERK AND EX-OFFICIO Clerk 
of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, of 
the State of Utah in and for UTAH COUNTY, do hereby certify 
that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the Deposit 
In Trust in this court: 
DEPOSIT IN TRUST 
CASE NO. 49,549 DAVID S, GROW 
-vs-
MARWICK DEVELOPMENT INC. 
1171-78 Checks placed in vault $7394.60 
$1747.44 
$1744.44 
11715-78 Order directing deposit 
11-27-78 Deposited - receipt No. 90179 $12 I 641. 92 
4-6-79 Tender of payment - David Olsen 
Check $8737.20 payable to Boardwalk (in vault) 
9-21-79 Checks 16752 $8737.20 16764 $3734.88 
deposited with clerk in account total 
TOTAL IN CLERK ACCOUNT 
$12,472.08 
$25,114.00 
I further certify that no certificate of deposit or any other 
type of payments have been deposited with this court in this office. 
IN vlI'I'NESS iVHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the official seal of said court at my office in Provo City, Utah 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE PAGE CONTINUED 
on this 15th day of January 1981, 
WILLIAM F, HUISH, CO\.)ilTY "CLERK 
BY () .~ \ __ ~ r. : ~ ~du~) ~ 
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK 
\ 
- '. ( 
/ 
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I. 
APPENDIX "B" 
AMOUNT NECESSARY TO CURE UNDER APPELLANT'S INTERPRETATION 




Interest at rate of 9.5% on Original 
Principal Amount of $205,000.00 from 
date of Contract through November 15, 
1977, the date of first default 
Interest at rate of 18% on Original 
Principal Amount from November 15, 
1977 through January 15, 1981 
Unpaid principal (otherwise paid if 
Contract had been honored) 
TOTAL DUE AND PAYABLE 
LESS PAYMENTS MADE 
TOTAL DUE AND PAYABLE 







II. AMOUNT NECESSARY TO CURE UNDER RESPONDENT'S INTERPRETATION 
OF PARAGRAPH llB 
1. Cure Amount as of August 9, 1978 
2. Thirty monthly payments of $1,747.44 
from August 15, 1978, through January 
15, 1981 
3. Interest at 1 1/2% per month on 30 
unpaid monthly installments through 
January 15, 1981 
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